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CASE COMMENTS
FINANCIAL WEAKNESS IS RELEVANT BUT INCONCLUSIVE AS DEFENSE
TO CLAYTON ACT VIOLATIONS
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324
(7th Cir. 1981)
In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. FTC' the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals curbed expansion of the test for determining viola-
tions of section 7 of the Clayton Act' by holding that the financial
weakness of the acquired company is insufficient, absent other relevant
nonstatistical evidence,3 to rebut a prima facie section 7 violation based
on market concentration statistics.
4
1. 652 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1981).
2. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or
any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
3. For discussion and examples of nonstatistical evidence to rebut the Government's prima
fade case, see notes 30 & 59 infra and accompanying text. See also note 61 infra.
4. Before measuring the anticompetitive effects of a merger, a court should define the rele-
vant market. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962); United States v. E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957); United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477
F.Supp. 1093, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 4ccord, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 359 (1963). The relevant market is comprised of both product and geographic markets. "The
product market identifies what line of commerce will be affected by a merger.... The geo-
graphic market establishes where a merger will affect competition." Note, Horizontal Mergers
ftier United States v. General Dynamics Corp, 92 HARv. L. REv. 491, 493-94 (1978). See 2 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 11522, 525a. For discussion of guidelines for determin-
ing product and geographic markets, see generally Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
325-28 (1962); In re American Gen. Ins. Co., 89 F.T.C. 557, 600-01 (1977); UNITED STATES DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, 1 TRADE REG. REP. 4510, at 6882-83 (1968); ABA ANTI-
TRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 64-70 (1975); 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra, at 517-28; L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 12 (1977); Raab,
Delineating the Relevant Market From Census Industry Classffcations, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 621
(1977); Stein & Brett, Market Deinition andMarket Power in Antitrust Cases-An EmpiricalPrimer
on "hen, Mhy and How, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 639 (1979); Note, Potential Production: A Sup-
ply Side Approach for Relevant Product Market Dxfnitions. 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 1199 (1979);
Note, The Role of Supply Substitutability in Defining the Relevant Product Market, 65 VA. L. REv.
129 (1979).
After establishing the relevant market, a court reviews statistics on the percentage, or concentra-
tion, of the market that would be controlled by the defendant company after the acquisition. To
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Kaiser, a leading producer of refractories,5 acquired two refractory
plants and related assets from one of its competitors, the Lavino Divi-
sion (Lavino) of International Minerals & Chemical Corporation. La-
vino was having difficulty recovering from the 1970 steel industry
slump. Prior to the acquisition, Lavino reduced production and ceased
expansion. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found 6 that Kai-
ser's acquisition of Lavino could substantially lessen competition 7 in
the refractories market' in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.9
Kaiser sought review of the FTC's cease and desist order,'0 claiming
arrive at the defendant's market power, the court compares the acquiring firm's market concentra-
tion with that of the firm's competitors. The court may find a prima facie § 7 violation if the
statistics accurately show that the defendant would acquire a high level of market power from the
merger. See, e.g., United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S.
441 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Tampa Elec. Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); United States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 538 (M.D.
Tenn. 1975); In re Jim Walker Corp., 90 F.T.C. 671 (1977).
One court stated that "the greater degree of market concentration, the greater is the likelihood
that parallel policies of mutual advantage, not competition, will emerge." United States v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (C.D. Cal. 1973), af'dmem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974) (citing
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964)).
5. Refractories are materials that line industrial furnaces and kilns and are resistant to in-
tense heat. Basic refractories, produced by both Kaiser and Lavino, come in preformed shapes
(bricks) and unformed material (specialties). Industries use specialties to seal or repair basic
bricks. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d at 1329 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 93 F.T.C. 764, 773, 829-30 (1979).
6. In re Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 93 F.T.C. at 773, 829-30.
7. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). The F.T.C. concluded that the acquisition:
(1) eliminated actual competition between Kaiser and Lavino in the refractories industry, (2) sub-
stantially increased concentration in the refractories industry, (3) made entry into the refractories
industry more difficult, and (4) strengthened Kaiser's position in the refractories industry. In re
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 93 F.T.C. at 823-24.
8. The FTC defined the geographic market as the entire United States and the product
market as basic refractories. The Commission divided the product market of basic refractories
into two submarkets: basic bricks, composed of conventional bricks for open-hearth furnaces and
BOF bricks, and basic specialties. 93 F.T.C. at 824, 833-36. Seegenerall, notes 4-5 supra. For the
response of Kaiser and the Seventh Circuit to the F.T.C.'s market definitions, see note 11 infra.
9. 93 F.T.C. at 855. The Commission also found a violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). The Commission found it unnecessary to consider sepa-
rately the § 5 violation because "any violation of§ 7 is a violation of§ 5." Id at 824 n.41 (citing
FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321-22 (1966)).
10. To rebut a prima facie § 7 violation, the FTC's Kaiser test required that a defendant
show:
(a) that one merging firm's market share (in this case, Lavino's) could not be imparted
to the other merging firm, so that any increase in concentration will not likely persist
over time, (b) that the merging firms had no control over the circumstances that weak-
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that the merger posed no threat to competition because of Lavino's
weakened condition.' 2 On review, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals overruled the FTC decision and held: The financial stability of
an acquired firm is a relevant but not primary consideration in rebut-
ting a prima facie section 7 violation of the Clayton Act.
13
The Clayton Act, enacted in 1914 in reaction to the common practice
of acquiring the stock of competitors, outlawed anticompetitive merg-
ers. 4 The plain language of the Act established the standard for sec-
tion 7 violations, making stock acquisitions illegal when the future
effect might substantially lessen competition.' 5 Congress amended the
ened the position of the merging firm whose market shares will be discounted and
(c) that neither firm could remedy the position of the weakened firm.
93 F.T.C. at 848.
11. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d at 1333. Kaiser claimed also that the
Commission erred in defining the product market. Id at 1331. See note 8 supra. Although the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals discounted the basis for Kaiser's contention, the court held that
the FTC had incorrectly defined the product market. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. FTC,
652 F.2d at 1332. Discussion of the relevant market issue of Kaiser is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
12. See notes 54-59 infra and accompanying text.
13. 652 F.2d at 1341.
14. A Senate Committee reported to the full Senate on the purpose of the Clayton Act as
follows:
[The Clayton Act], in its treatment of unlawful restraints and monopolies, seeks to
prohibit and make unlawful certain trade practices which. . . are not covered by the
[Sherman Act] or other existing anti-trust acts, and thus, by making these practices ille-
gal, to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency and
before consummation.
S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568,
577 (1967); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275, 277 (1966); United States v. E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
284 F.2d 599, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'don other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Co., 264 F. 138, 162 (E.D. Mo. 1920). See generally FTC ANN. REP. 16
(1948); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (1949); STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON
SMALL BUSINESS, 87TH CONG., MERGERS AND SUPERCONCENTRATION 16 (Comm. Print 1962)
[hereinafter cited as MERGERS AND SUPERCONCENTRATION]; S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 4, reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 4293,4293-99; W. THORNTON, COMBINATIONS
IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE pt. II (1928); Bok, Section 7 ofthe Clayton .4ct and the Merging of Law
and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 255 (1960); Carter, The Clayton Act, Orinal Section 7:
Re-Examination and Reappraisal, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 187 (1963).
15. The original draft of § 7 of the Clayton Act stated in pertinent part:
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged also in
commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competi-
tion between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the
acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create
a monopoly of any line of commerce.
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Act in 195016 to broaden the scope of section 7 violations.' 7 The 1950
amendment reached both asset 18 and stock' 9 acquisitions. Congress re-
tained the language "where. . .the effect. . . may be to substantially
lessen competition,"'20 reflecting the legislative intent to invalidate
mergers in which an anticompetitive effect 2' is reasonably probable.
22
Ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)). For comparison with
the current version see note 2 supra.
16. The 1926-1930 and post-World War II merger movements left the American economy
with a high level of economic concentration. Fearing the trend would continue and leave most of
America's business to only a few corporations, Congress amended § 7 of the Clayton Act to check
the growth of concentration. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 496
(1974); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 557-58 (1972); Ford Motor Co. v.
United States, 405 U.S. 562, 569 n.5 (1972); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276
(1966); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1964); United States v. Phila-
delphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 337-41 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
315 (1962); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 509-10 (3d Cir.
1969); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1231-32 (C.D. Cal. 1973). See generally FTC ANN.
REP. 16-20 (1948); H.R. REP. No. 1191, supra note 14, at 2-5; MERGERS AND SUPERCONCENTRA-
TION, supra note 14, at 1-20; S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 14, at 4; Bok, supra note 14, at 228-38;
Comment, "Substantiality to Lessen Competition... "" Current Problems of Horizontal Mergers,
68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1627-30 (1959).
17. See note 2 supra. See also notes 23-24 infra.
18. See generalo FTC, REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 88 (1955).
19. See generally id at 85. To evade violations under the 1914 Clayton Act, corporations
merged by purchasing the physical assets, rather than the stock, of their competitors. Neither the
Justice Department nor the FTC could enforce the original § 7 against such acquisitions. See,
e.g., Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); FTC v. Western Meat Co.,
272 U.S. 554 (1926); United States v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 91 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). See
also United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 281 (1974); United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 337-39 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962); 95 CONG. REC. 11485 (1949); FTC ANN. REP. 16-18 (1948); H.R. REP.
No. 1191, supra note 14, at 4-5; NATIONAL COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, OFF. ATr'Y
GEN., ANTITRUST LAWS 115-18 (1955); MERGERS AND SUPERCONCENTRATION, supra note 14, at
18-19; Note, All the King's Horses and All the King's Men: The Failing Company Doctrine as a
Conditional Defense to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 643, 673 (1976).
20. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
21. Congress recognized that not all mergers threaten competition. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 6-8 (1949). See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 600 (1965);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319, 331, 334-35 (1962); International Shoe Co. v.
FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930); American Press Ass'n v. United States, 245 F. 91, 93-94 (7th
Cir. 1917); Note, Horizontal Mergers After United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 92 HARV. L.
REv. 491, 506-08 (1978). See also note 50 infra.
22. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 539 (1972); FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278
(1966); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594-95 (1965); United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651,
658 (1964); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962) (quoting S. REP. No. 1775,
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The language "in any line of commerce in any section of the country"
provides for a section 7 violation even if the acquisition causes a lessen-
ing of competition23 in a geographic or product market not normally
affected by the business of the merging firms.2 4
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,"5 the first major postamendment
decision, 6 the United States Supreme Court expanded the test for the
application 27 of section 7.28 The Supreme Court found that market
concentration statistics were primary but inconclusive indicators of
x Ist Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950)); United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 598
(1957); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1922); Luria Bros.
& Co. v. FTC, 389 F.2d 847, 863-64 (3d Cir. 1968); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430
F Supp. 729, 742 (D. Md. 1976); United States v. Amax, 402 F.Supp. 956, 960 (D. Conn. 1975);
United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F.Supp. 1226, 1232 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff dmem, 418
U S. 906 (1974); In re Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 1074, 1165 (1976); S. REP. No. 1775, supra
note 14, at 6; Note, The Failing Compan, Doctrine Since General Dynamics: More Than Excess
Baggage, 47 FoRDHANt L. REv. 872, 886 (1979). Cf Bok, supra note 14, at 254-55 (defendants
cannot be given benefit of every substantial doubt even when legislative history stated that Gov-
ernment must show "reasonable probability" that anticompetitive effects will occur). See also
FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
23. Congress deleted the language "between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and
the corporation making the acquisition." Compare note 2 supra with note 15 supra. With the
deletion, the legislators intended to make all mergers-not just horizontal mergers-susceptible to
§ 7. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 557 n.12 (1972); FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S.
586, 590 (1957); S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 14, at 4.
24. In its report to accompany the proposed 1950 amendment, the Senate provided that:
[Al Ithough the section of the country in which there may be a lessening of competition
will normally be one in which the acquired company or the acquiring company may do
business, the bill is broad enough to cope with a substantial lessening of competition in
any other section of the country as well.
S REP. No. 1775, supra note 22, at 7-8. Several cases demonstrate limits on expanding the scope
of affected markets. See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549 (1966);
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441,456-57 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natu-
ral Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 657 (1964); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 333-
35 (1961); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949); L.G. Balfour Co. v.
FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 14 (7th Cir. 1971); In re American Gen. Ins. Co., 89 F.T.C. 557, 600-01 (1977);
Equifax v. FTC, [1980-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,312 (9th Cir.).
25. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
26. See also United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); United
States v. Schenley Indus., Inc., [1957] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,664 (D. Del); United States v. Gen-
eral Shoe Corp., [1956] Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,271 (M.D. Tenn.); United States v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., [1956] Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,253 (N.D. Ill.); United States v. Minute Maid, [1955] Trade
Cas. (CCH) 1 68,131 (S.D. Fla.).
27. The Court commented:
Congress neither adopted nor rejected specifically any particular tests for measuring
the relevant markets, either as defined in terms of product or in terms of geographic
locus of competition, within which the anticompetitive effects of a merger were to be
judged. Nor did it adopt a definition of the word "substantially," whether in quantita-
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probable future anticompetitive effects.29 The Court stated that the
structure, history, and probable future of the relevant market were also
relevant considerations in determining whether a section 7 violation
had occurred.3" The Brown Shoe Court cautioned courts not to expand
the inquiry into peripheral economic facts.
One year later the Supreme Court simplified the test for examining
mergers in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank.32 Because the
merger of two banks would have resulted in one bank controlling more
than thirty percent of the city's banking business, the Court found it
unnecessary to make a broad economic inquiry.33 The Court held that
a merger creating such an "undue percentage share" 34 was inherently
ive terms of sales or assets or market shares or in designated qualitative terms by which
a merger's effects on competition were to be measured.
370 U.S. at 320-21. For further discussion see id at 321 n.36; United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F.
Supp. 956, 961 & n.16 (D. Conn. 1975).
28. 370 U.S. at 316-23.
29. 370 U.S. at 322. Several lower courts have relied on the Brown Shoe test. See, e.g.,
Northwest Power Prod., Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1978); United States
v. International Harvester, 564 F.2d 769, 773-74 (7th Cir. 1978); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.
v. FTC, 414 F.2d 974, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1969); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088,
1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re American Gen. Ins. Co., 89 F.T.C. 557, 601-02 (1977). See also Hayes
v. Soloman, 597 F.2d 958, 985 (5th Cir. 1979). See generally Barnes, The Primacy of Competition
and the Brown Shoe Decision, 51 GEo. L.J. 706 (1963); Jones, The New Thrust of the Antimerger
.4at: The Brown Shoe Decision, 38 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 229 (1963); Peterman, The Brown Shoe
Case, 18 J.L. & ECON. 81 (1975); Subcommittee on Section 7 of the Clayton Act, ABA Section of
Antitrust Law, Implications ofBrown Shoefor Merger Law and Enforcement, 8 ANTITRUST BULL.
225 (1963); Comment, MoreAdo About Mergers: Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 4 B.C. INDUS.
& CoM. L. REv. 159 (1962); 27 ALBANY L. REV. 54 (1963).
30. 370 U.S. at 322 n.38. Before determining a § 7 violation, the Court weighed the following
against the concentration statistics: easy access to suppliers by buyers, foreclosure by suppliers
and buyers, and difficulty or ease of entering the market. Id at 322.
31. Id at 340-41. The Court warned against making already complex antitrust litigation
more confusing. See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 313 (1949).
32. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
33. The Court explained the applicability of its new test: "Such a test lightens the burden of
proving illegality only with respect to mergers whose size makes them inherently suspect in light
of Congress' design in § 7 to prevent undue concentration." Id at 363. The Court purported to
retain the Brown Shoe test when the size of the acquisition was not inherently suspect and re-
quired further economic data to find or rebut a § 7 violation. Id at 355. See generally The
Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARv. L. REv. 79, 159-63 (1963). See also 13 DE PAUL L. REv.
137 (1963); 1964 DUKE L.. 139.
34. Courts have not defined what percent of the market is "undue." See note 33 supra and
accompanying text.
The Court examined the legislative intent for the 1950 amendment of § 7 and found that Con-
gress avoided the use of quantitative tests. Congess did, however, condone past court interpreta-
tions of the same language used in other sections of the Clayton Act. H.R. REP. No. 1191, supra
note 14, at 8. Two months prior to the House report, the Supreme Court used a quantitative test
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suspect of negatively affecting competition 35 and in violation of the
Clayton Act.36 The Court restated the Brown Shoe concept of rebutta-
ble market statistics,37 but the practical effect of the decision severely
minimized examination of nonstatistical data.38 For more than ten
years the United States Government won every merger case reaching
the Supreme Court.3 9 Armed with the quantitative test of Philadelphia
National Bank, the Court's emphasis shifted to a stricter reliance on
m finding a § 3 violation in Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). Al-
though the House report did not remark on the Standard Oil decision, Congress' general approval
of court interpretations of the test provided support for finding a prima facie § 7 violation based
on a high percentage of market shares. Cf. Tampa Elec. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320
1961) (no § 3 violation where defendant had only one percent of total market).
35. 374 U.S. at 363. See, eg., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) (prior
to acquisition the merging firms accounted for 60% and 28% of the relevant market); United States
v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964) (merger would have increased the acquiring firm's
market share to 25% and reduced the number of competitors). Cf. United States v. Von's Grocery
Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (merger of two already powerful companies found illegal even though
combined companies would have had only 7.5% of market); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (though adding only 1.3% to the acquiring firm's market share, the
acquisition would likely result in anticompetitive effects within the relevant market). But cf.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), afdper curiam, 347
U S. 521 (1954) (court gave some weight to the 75% market concentration the companies would
have had but found the merger illegal on other grounds).
36. 374 U.S. at 366.
37. Id at 355. The Court stated its intention to adhere to the test it established in Brown
Shoe: "We analyzed the test in detail in Brown Shoe Co. Y. United States .... and found that
analysis need not be repeated or extended here, for the instant case presents only a straightforward
problem of application to particular facts." Id (citations omitted). See In re Pillsbury Co., 93
F.T.C. 966, 1033-34 (1979).
38. The Court accepted the statistics as support for a prima facie violation "in the absence of
evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects." 374
U.S. at 363. The defendants presented no evidence to rebut the percentages. Id at 366. See note
33 supra.
Some commentators overlook the Court's willingness to consider nonstatistical evidence and
interpret Philade/hla Nat'7Bank as completely rejecting the Brown Shoe test. See, e.g., 24 DRAKE
L. REV. 223 (1974). But see Note, supra note 22, at 875. See also United States v. M.P.M., Inc.,
397 F. Supp. 78, 91-92 (D. Colo. 1975); In re American Gen. Ins. Co., 89 F.T.C. 557, 603-04
(1977).
39. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1970); United States v. Phillipsburg
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131
(1969); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); FTC v. Consoli-
dated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441
(1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964);
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294 (1962). In United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), the Gov-
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market statistics.4"
A new judicial approach to section 7 cases emerged in United S/ates
v. General Dynamics Corp.4" in which the Supreme Court reestablished
the Brown Shoe42 rebuttable presumption of illegality.43 The General
Dynamics Court focused on determining what effect on competition, if
any, would result from the merger.'  Although the merged coal com-
panies in question controlled twenty-three percent of the market,4 5 the
Court asserted that the statistics were significant46 but inconclusive in-
dicators of future anticompetitive effects. The Court reviewed the dis-
trict court's research on coal market operations47 and found that the
industry almost exclusively involved committing coal reserves under
long-term contracts.48 Because the acquired company had contracted
away all its coal reserves and additional mineable strip reserves were
ernment lost its first § 7 merger case since Brown Shoe. See notes 41-53 infra and accompanying
text.
In response to the majority's assertion that its ruling in United States v. Von's Grocery Co. was
consistent with its prior § 7 decisions, Justice Stewart stated in his dissent: "The sole consistency
that I find is that in litigation under § 7, the Government always wins." United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
40. See generally Chaffetz, What's Left ofMergers, 23 Bus. LAW 599 (1968); Hale & Hale, In
Aggravation a/Merger, 43 IND. L.J. 365 (1968); Hampton, The Merger Movement in Historic Per-
spectiv" 4 Lawyerr iew, 25 Bus. LAW. 653 (1970); Loevinger, How To Succeed in Business
Without Being Tried--he Potentiality ofAntitrust Prosecution, 12 Aiuz. L. REV. 443 (1970); Wil-
der & Wilder, Target Company Defensive Tactics Under Section 7 of the Clayton 4ct, 4 CONN. L.
REv. 352 (1971).
41. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
42. The Philadelpha Nat'lBank Court neither abolished nor actively applied the Brown Shoe
test. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. See also note 29 supra and accompanying text.
43. See Inre American Gen. Ins. Co., 89 F.T.C. 557, 603-04 (1977); In re Liggett & Meyers,
Inc., 87 F.T.C. 1074, 1170-71 (1976).
44. 415 U.S. at 505-06.
45. Id. at 494-96.
46. Compare notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text with notes 33-35 supra and accompa-
nying text.
47. The district court concluded: (1) the decline in the number of coal producers occurred
because of change in the demand for coal rather than the acquisition of small coal producers;
(2) the merging firms were complimentary: one company strip mined and the other deep mined;
(3) the merged companies directly competed for only one customer;, and (4) the acquired firm's
uncommitted coal reserves were too low to compete for future contracts, indicating that the Gov-
ernment's statistics inaccurately reflected future anticompetitive effects. United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534, 558-59 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
48. The utility industry is the primary market for coal producers. An inconsistency in coal
supply can disrupt the costly operation of utility plants. Utilities, therefore, commonly arrange for
long-term contracts for most of their fuel needs. Id at 543.
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unavailable,49 the Court concluded that the company could neither
continue to compete in the coal market nor pose a threat to competi-
tion. The Court rejected the Government's assertion that reliance on
depleted resources was essentially a failing company defense5" which
required strict application.5' The Court found that the failing company
49. Id
50. Congress preserved the failing company defense when passing the 1950 amendment to
the Clayton Act. The failing company defense, created by the Supreme Court in International
Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930), is the only defense to § 7 not within the terms of the statute.
The Senate report on the proposed 1950 amendment quoted the Supreme Court:
[In a case ol a corporation with resources so depleted and the prospect of rehabilita-
tion so remote that it faced the grave probability of a business failure with resulting loss
to its stockholders and injury to the communities where its plants were operated, we hold
that the purchase of its capital stock by a competitor (there being no other prospective
purchasers) . . . does not substantially . . . lessen competition or restrain commerce
within the intent of the Clayton Act.
S. REP. No. 1775, supra note 14, at 7 (quoting International Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302
(1930)).
In 1950 when Congress increased the effectiveness of§ 7, it also increased the importance of the
failing company defense. Defendants frequently turned to the defense in an attempt to justify
mergers. See, e.g., United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 (1971); Citizen Pub-
hshing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); FTC v. National Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir.
1979); F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1979); Granader
v Public Bank, 417 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1065 (1970); United States v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F.
Supp. 78 (D. Colo. 1975); In re Pillsbury Co., 93 F.T.C. 966 (1979); In re Reichhold Chem., Inc.,
91 F.T.C. 246 (1978), a.ff'dmenL, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 21, 566 (4th Cir. 1979). See gener-
all
, 
Hearings on the Failing Company Defense Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and
Business Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Failing Company Hearings]; H.R. REP. No. 1191, supra note 14, at 6-8; S. REP. No. 1775, supra
note 14, at 7; Blum, The Failing Company Doctrine, 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 75 (1975); Bok,
supra note 14; Connor, Section 7 of the Clayton Act." The "Failing Company" Myth, 49 GEo. L.J.
84 (1960); Dooley, Failing Company Doctrine: Recent Developments, 47 TEX. L. REv. 1437 (1969);
Hale & Hale, Failing Firms andthe Merger Frovisions of theAntitrust Laws, 52 Ky. L.J. 597 (1964);
Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61
COLUM L. REv. 629 (1961); Low, The Failing Company Doctrine: An Illusive Economic Defense
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 425 (1967); McDavid, Failing Companies
and the Antitrust Laws, 14 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 229 (1981); Note, supra note 22; Note, supra note
2 1; Note, supra note 19; Comment, FederalAntitrust Law-Mergers-An Updating of the "Failing
Company"Doctrine in the Amended Section 7Setting, 61 MICH. L. REv. 566 (1963); Note, Horizon-
tal Mergers and the "Failing Firm" Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Caveat, 45 VA.
L. REV. 421 (1959); Comment, supra note 16; 65 CORNELL L. REv. 438 (1980).
51. The Court provided: "A company invoking the defense has the burden of showing that
its 'resources [were] so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced the grave
probability of a business failure. . . ' and further that it tried and failed to merge with a com-
pany other than the acquiring one." 415 U.S. at 507 (citations omitted).
Courts have retained the International Shoe test for determining the applicability of the failing
company defense. See note 50 supra.
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defense was irrelevant52 because the acquisition was not illegal.
5 3
After General Dynamics, courts began to examine business realities
and retreat from substantial reliance on market statistics.5 4  Some
courts broadly construed the General Dynamics decision and inter-
preted the Supreme Court's consideration of the acquired company's
inability to compete as a weak company defense.5 5 In United States v.
International Harvester Co. 56 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ap-
proved a merger in which the acquired firm had insufficient financial
resources57 to remain a viable competitor.58 Relying on General Dy-
namics for support, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court was
correct in considering, along with other nonstatistical factors, evidence
of the acquired company's competitive weakness.
5 9
52. See 415 U.S. at 508-09.
53. Id at 501, 508. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text. See generally Moyer,
United States v. General Dynamies Corp: An Interpretation, 20 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1975); Note,
supra note 21.
54. Some courts held that the defendant had the burden to go forward in presenting non-
statistical evidence after the Government established its prima fade case. See, e.g., United States
v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120 (1975); United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.,
418 U.S. 602, 631 (1974); United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 956, 970 n.53 (D. Conn. 1975);
United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 92 (D. Colo. 1975).
55. See, e.g., FTC v. National Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979); F. & M. Schaefer Corp.
v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See generally 65 CORNELL L. REV. 438 (1980).
One commentator stated that "the criticisms of attempts to expand the General Dynamics de-
fense are well-founded. The Supreme Court did not intend to create a new defense or to modify
the failing company doctrine. It merely held that the courts must realistically evaluate competi-
tive strength." McDavid, supra note 50, at 247.
56. 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
57. Id at 774. The court compared insufficient financial resources to insufficient coal
reserves. Id at 773. For a critical analysis of the comparison, see 65 CORNELL L. REV. 438, 447
(1980).
58. Commentators have widely criticized the International Harvester decision. John Shene-
fled, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, stated in the Failing Company Hearings:
[The International Harvester rationale: that is the notion that financial weakness
short of failing company status can serve as a judicially cognizable defense, is incorrect
and inconsistent with the requirements of the GeneralDynamics holding. . . . [W]hile
in a close case, financial weakness may be among other factors we would consider....
the Antitrust Division is unlikely to be particularly receptive to the argument that "finan-
cial weakness" is a defense to an otherwise illegal merger.
Failing Company Hearings, supra note 50, at 33-34.
See generally McDavid, supra note 50, at 246-47; Note, supra note 22, at 873, 885; Note, supra
note 21, at 511; 65 CORNELL L. REV. 438, 477 (1980).
59. 564 F.2d at 773. The court stated "theprimafacie case presented by the Government was
rebutted by persuasive evidence, including [the acquired firm's] weakened financial condition
d at 774. Before validating the merger, the Court of Appeals listed and approved the use
of nonstatistical evidence examined by the district court. Those factors were: the acquired coin-
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In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. FTC6" the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit concluded that although market concentration
statistics can stand alone to establish a prima facie section 7 violation, a
defendant may introduce nonstatistical evidence6t to expose the inac-
curacy of the statistics as indicators of a merger's future impact on com-
petition.62 Judge Baker, writing for the court, analyzed the history and
legislative background of section 763 and concluded that Congress in-
tended the courts to actively enforce the Clayton Act by choking off
anticompetitive mergers before injuries to the market occurred.'
Judge Baker examined the test for section 7 as applied by the Supreme
Court in Brown Shoe,"5 Philadelhia National Bank,6 6 and General Dy-
namics,67 and found that the basis for determining section 7 violations
was market concentration statistics.68  The court required accuracy
69
and relevancy7" of the statistics. The court stated that a defendant may
always offer nonstatistical evidence7' to rebut the Government's prima
pany's financial weakness, the number and power of market competitors, the actual independence
of acquired firm and its improved status as a competitor after acquisition, the increasing level of
competition in the relevant market, and ease of entry into the market. Id at 777-79.
60. 652 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1981).
61. The court noted that the trier of fact must weigh the statistical with the nonstatistical
evidence to determine whether the merger will negatively affect competition. Judge Baker com-
mented that the trier of fact may consider "ease of entry into the market, the trend of the market
either toward or away from concentration, and the continuation of active price competition." Id
at 1341. For nonstatistical factors considered by other courts, see notes 30 & 59 supra and accom-
panying text.
62. 652 F.2d at 1341.
63. Id at 1333.
64. Id at 1333, n.6.
65. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). For the court's discussion of
Brown Shoe, see 652 F.2d at 1333-34. For discussion of the Brown Shoe test, see notes 25-31 supra
and accompanying text.
66. United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). For the court's discussion
of Philadephia Nat'l Bank, see 652 F.2d at 1334. For discussion of the Philadelphia Nat! Bank
test, see notes 32-40 supra and accompanying text.
67. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). For the court's discussion
of General Dwamis, see 652 F.2d at 1335-38. For discussion of the General Dynamics test, see
notes 41-53 supra and accompanying text.
68. 652 F.2d at 1341. Judge Baker stated that "[m]arket concentration statistics continue to
be the primary index for measuring market power ... ." Id
69. Id. at 1341. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
70. 652 F.2d at 1341.
71. Id. The court stated: "Nonstatistical evidence which casts doubt on the persuasive quali-
ty of the statistics to predict future anticompetitive consequences may be offered to rebut the
prima facie case made out by the statistics." Id See also notes 30, 59 & 61 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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facie case because the objective is to find an accurate measure of future
competition in the relevant market.72
In rejecting the defendant's assertion of a weak company defense,73
Judge Baker identified the Seventh Circuit's decision in International
Harvester as the source of confusion concerning the availability of such
a defense to alleged section 7 violators.74 He admitted that the Interna-
tional Harvester court had considered the acquired firm's financial con-
dition but stressed the court's attention to other factors as well.75
According to Judge Baker, InternationalHarvester illustrated that a de-
fense based solely on financial weakness was insufficient to justify a
merger.76 The Kaiser Court stated that an acquisition of a weak com-
pany by a strong company deters competitors and potential entrants
from procuring the weak company's customers.77 Furthermore, a weak
company defense would expand the failing company doctrine,78 con-
tradicting limitations strictly enforced by the United States Supreme
Court.79 Judge Baker stated that any characterizations of International
Harvester as adopting a weak company defense were clearly in error.80
By defining the limits of the test for section 7 violations of the Clay-
72. 652 F.2d at 1341. Judge Baker criticized the FTC's interpretation and application of
GeneralDynamics and concluded that the Commission should have applied the established rule of
attacking the accuracy of the statistics instead of attempting to develop further testing criteria
from the facts of General Dyanmics. Id at 1339-40. For the FTC's testing criteria, see note 10
supra.
The court listed the Commission's errors as follows: (1) General Dynamics does not require an
affirmative defense, only that the defendant come forward with evidence to rebut the prima facie
case; (2) General Dynamics does not require the defendant to show that the merger will cause a
persistent increase in its market power because only a negligible market share was transferred in
that case; (3) showing that the acquiring firm did not cause the acquired firm's weakened state is
irrelevant because § 7 is concerned only with future prospects; and (4) no situation would ever
arise to meet the Commission's test that neither firm could remedy the weak firm's position be-
cause no firm would ever acquire another firm that would always remain weak. 652 F.2d at 1340.
See.In re Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 93 F.T.C. 764, 847-48 (1979).
73. Kaiser asserted that General Dynamics created a weak company defense. 652 F.2d at
1338.
74. Id at 1338.
75. Id at 1338-39. See United States v. International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769, 773 (7th
Cir. 1977).
76. 652 F.2d at 1339. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
77. 652 F.2d at 1339.
78. Id
79. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974); United States v. Greater
Buffalo Press, 402 U.S. 549 (1971); Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
80. 652 F.2d at 1339. See note 58 supra.
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ton Act,8" the Kaiser decision effectuated congressional intent"2 and
presented workable guidelines for the courts. The underlying premise
of section 7 is the prevention of mergers that threaten the competitive
process.8 3 Because section 7 prohibits acquisitions that "probably" will
cause anticompetitive effects," courts need methods for predicting the
outcome of mergers. The Seventh Circuit properly adopted the use of
market concentration statistics as the primary index for determining
the future market power of merging firms.85
The Kaiser decision conforms to the spirit of section 7 as inferred
from Congress' two expressed exceptions to the Act. First, the plain
language of the statute8 6 allows mergers that probably will not cause
anticompetitive effects.87 Kaiser ensures a defendant's right to acquire
another company by allowing rebuttal of statistical evidence to show
that the merger will not threaten competition."8 Rebuttal evidence also
checks the accuracy and relevance of the market statistics.8 9 Second,
the legislative history of section 7 illustrates Congress' intention to pro-
vide a failing company defense. 9 Kaiser leaves that defense intact by
not only allowing rebuttal evidence of a company's depleted status but
also refusing to expand it into a weak company defense. 9' Allowing a
company to justify a merger on the basis of its weakened condition
would undercut the purpose of the statute. Merger with a strong com-
pany, in most instances, will revitalize a weak company, leaving one
less market competitor and one even stronger market power.92 Such a
result would be contrary to the congressional intent of protecting
competition.93
Although the International Harvester court properly considered
8 1. See notes 60-80 supra and accompanying text.
82. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
83. Id
84. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 4 & 34 supra and accompanying text. For discussion of the use of market
statistics in other § 7 cases, see notes 29-38, 46-47 & 54 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 2 supra.
87. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
88. See notes 21 & 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
89. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
90. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
91. See notes 73-80 supra and accompanying text.
92. See notes 58 & 76-79 supra and accompanying text.
93. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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many relevant factors before finding no section 7 violation,94 its consid-
eration of the acquired company's weakened financial state was irrec-
oncilable with the legal principles established by the Supreme Court in
General Dynamics. The International Harvester court failed to distin-
guish between revivable and unrevivable weakened companies. 9 Gen-
eral Dynamics, however, allowed consideration of the weak company
factor only in the second instance.96 Kaiser did not address the manner
in which the International Harvester court handled the weak company
factor beyond stating that it had considered other factors along with
weakness. 9
7
Kaiser's repression of a weak company defense is commendable. Al-
though Kaiser did not expand the failing company defense, it did ex-
tend the Supreme Court's decision in General Dynamics by approving
International Harester's consideration of a weak company claim
where revitalization of the weak company is possible.98 The decision
would be more significant had the Seventh Circuit drawn a distinction
between the two cases and defined the limits, if any, for considering
financial weakness. Courts then would have a more complete guideline
for determining invalid mergers.
94. See notes 59 & 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
95. 564 F.2d at 773-74. For criticism of the court's omission, see 65 CORNELL L. REV. 438,
477 (1980).
96. See note 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 73-79 supra and accompanying text.
98. See id. See also notes 49 & 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 60:631
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/13
